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perform an analysis of some debt dynamics. With unchanged fiscal policies, Japan's public debt will
rise to between 260% and 380% of GDP in 2030, and to between 700% and 1300% in 2040 --
clearly unsustainable levels. For the debt to be sustainable, significant increases in taxes, or cuts in
government spending are necessary.
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  Japan’s deteriorating fiscal situation has attracted world-wide attention.  
If the situation does not improve, the resulting huge public debt is expected to 
sharply  increase  Japanese  interest  rates,  lower  Japan’s  international 
creditworthiness, and adversely affect the welfare of future generations. In this 
chapter I assess what current Japanese government fiscal policies mean for the future 
of  public debt  and the  economy in  general,  given the  inevitable aging of the 
population. 
  Owing to a very weak domestic economy, which lowered tax revenues and raised 
government spending, Japan’s fiscal balance has deteriorated dramatically. The 
budget, in surplus until 1992, turned negative in 1993 and the deficits have  continued 
to worsen, reaching almost 11% of GDP in 1998.  Debt ballooned: the government 
debt-to-GDP ratio increased by almost half from 1991 to 1997 and by another quarter 
in the two  years  after  that.  By  2000,  Japan  had  the  largest  ratio  among  OECD countries.  
  Japan's  fiscal  situation  continues  to  look  grim,  especially  given  the 
demographic situation. Population aging is expected to slow economic growth and raise 
future government health care and social security expenditures. Projections of the 
country’s population and the percentage of the total population that is elderly 
(Ministry of Health and Welfare 1998) are plotted in Figure 1. 
  The population over 65 has grown rapidly, and now stands at about 15%. By 
2020, its percentage is expected to approach 25%, and by 2050, 33%. These rates of 
aging are much higher than, for example, in the United States, where only about 15% 
of the population will be over 65 by 2025. 
  This chapter first reviews how Japan got into its current fiscal mess during 
the 1990s. This is followed by an analysis of debt dynamics. With unchanged fiscal 
policies, Japan’s public debt will rise to between 260% and 380% of GDP in 2020, 
and to between 700% and 1300% in 2040 - clearly unsustainable levels. For the debt 
to be sustainable, significant increases in taxes, or cuts in government spending 
are necessary. 
  Next, the government’s fiscal agendas are briefly discussed.  The focus has 
been on spending cuts rather than tax increases. However, most of the proposed cuts 
were postponed or abandoned as the government sought to stimulate demand in light 
of  the  very  weak  domestic  economy.  The  results  of  a  simulation  exercise  that  explicitly 
incorporates the effects of an aging Japanese population are then presented. In the 
simulation, I explicitly model the interplay between government fiscal policies and 
household  and  corporate  behaviors.    This  is  important,  because  fiscal  policies  clearly 
can affect private behavior, and these changes in private behavior may, in turn, influence the dynamics of government debt. The simulation shows that, absent cuts 
in government spending, for the government debt to be sustainable, taxes would need 
to increase from the current 28% of GDP to over 40% by 2020. The tax increases and 
the inevitable aging of the population are projected to sharply reduce household 
saving rates. As the labor force declines, and the need to equip workers with capital 
decreases, corporate investment rates also are projected to fall. 
 
 
1  The Current Japanese Fiscal Situation 
 
Government saving declined and public investment rose in the 1990s (Table 1).  These 
trends were caused by the recession, as well as by structural changes. The recession 
and the decline in the rate of economic growth lowered tax revenues.  Structural 
changes  that  worsened  government  saving  included  tax reforms  that  lowered tax 
elasticities and thus tax revenues; and the aging of the population, which raised 
social  security  and  health  care  expenditures.    In  the  1990s  the  government  also  boosted 
public investment in an attempt to stimulate aggregate demand. These changes in 
government saving and public investment led to a sharp deterioration in government 
finances.  The resulting increase in outstanding bonds has raised concerns about 
fiscal sustainability and calls for fiscal reform. 
 
1.1  Government Saving 
Government saving can be divided into its “full-employment” and “cyclical” 
components. In a recessionary environment government spending usually increases 
because of higher unemployment and social welfare benefits. However, owing to the 
low cyclical variability of Japanese unemployment and social welfare benefits, 
government spending increases in Japan during the 1990s recession were capped. Also 
during recessions, tax revenues can decline because of lowered incomes. I estimate 
that during 1990-99, Japan’s “full-employment” government saving was about 2.6% 
of GDP, compared to an actual level of 2.0%, making the “cyclical” component -0.6%.  
Thus, much of the decline in government saving in the late 1990s was from structural 
factors, such as tax reductions, rather than from “automatic stabilizers.”
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1 I estimate “full-employment” government saving by regressing government saving on the output 
gap and a constant, using quarterly data from 1990 to 1999.  I interpret the estimated value of 
the constant - which is the government saving rate when the output gap is equal to zero - as 
“full-employment” government saving.  The estimated value of the constant equaled 2.6%.   Government saving also can be broken down into the social security surplus, 
the surplus in other categories, and health care expenditures (Table 2).  The social 
security surplus (benefits minus contributions) fell from about 1.3% of GDP in the 
early 1990s to about 0.4% in 1999 because of the recession (lowering contributions) 
and increase in the number of elderly (raising benefits).  Government health care 
expenditures rose from about 3.6% of GDP in the early 1990s to about 4.3% in 1999, 
mainly owing to the increase in the elderly, who use most of the hospital services. 
However, the health care expenditure-to-GDP ratio in Japan is still smaller than in 
the United States (6.6%) and Germany (7.7%). The remaining category of government 
saving includes such items as education, defense, and policing and firefighting.  
Saving in this category declined sharply from 9.5% of GDP to 3.9% because of the fall 
in income and consumption tax revenues. 
 
1.2  Public Investment 
During the 1990s the Japanese government passed 10 stimulus packages in an attempt 
to jump-start the stalled economy.  The most important component of these packages 
was public works, which are included in public investment. However, the actual 
increases  in  the  late  1990s  were  rather  moderate  compared  to  the  prominent  and  headline 
grabbing role of public works in the stimulus packages. 
  There are two reasons actual public works fell short of announced levels.  
First, the central government assigned roughly two-thirds of the increased public 
works spending to local governments without providing a commensurate increase in 
funding.  The capacity of local governments to expand public investment was affected 
by their poor financial situation, and the continued rise in public investment has 
increasingly  been  financed  through  local  bond  issues.    The  amount  of  outstanding  local 
government bonds increased from 12% of GDP in 1990 to 22% in 1997.  Many local 
governments surpassed the legally allowed threshold of bonds outstanding and were 
put under bond issuance restrictions by the central government.  Second, some of the 
public investment funds provided by the stimulus packages remained unused because 
of poor project implementation.  Ishii and Wada (1998) calculated that only 60% to 
                                                                                                                                                  
  Ihori,  Nakazato, and  Kawade  (2002)  also  show that  the  “cyclical” component of government 
saving was small.  They find that much of the decline in government saving can be attributed to 
the decline in “trend” output, rather than to the decline in “cyclical” output. The low cyclical 
variability of  government  saving is  corroborated  in an  IMF  study  showing that  a  one-percentage  point 
increase in the output gap translated into an increase of the cyclical deficit by about 0.33% of 




1.3  Government Debt and Liabilities 
The late 1990s decline in government saving and rise in public investment led to a 
surge in government debt, as shown in Table 2.  The fiscal surplus declined almost 
continuously in the 1990s until reaching about minus 11% in  1998. The 1999 improvement 
has not carried over in the 2000s.  Correspondingly, the ratio of debt to GDP has 
risen sharply.  By international standards, Japan’s gross debt-to-GDP in 1999 was 
the highest among the G-7 countries; Italy’s was 115% and the United States’ was 
62%. 
  The fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP is less than the difference between 
the government saving ratio and the public investment ratio (Table 1, column 2 minus 
column 4) by about two percentage points, mainly because of the inclusion of net 
government land purchases in the fiscal balance.  During the 1990s the government 
bought significant amounts of land from the private sector to prop up land prices.   
  Because of the partly funded nature of the Japanese pension system, as well 
as the government’s major role in financial intermediation, the Japanese government 
holds significant assets, keeping net debt-to-GDP at a moderate level and lower than 
in other G-7 countries. However, the assets of the social security system are more 
than offset by future pension obligations. Therefore, some, including the OECD and 
the IMF, exclude social security net assets when assessing Japan’s debt situation. 
As a result, Japan’s net debt excluding social security net assets, at 85%, is 
significantly higher than the United States’ 60%, and Germany’s 53%. 
 
 
2  Projecting the Debt Burden 
 
Table 3 depicts the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio under three scenarios about 
tax, public investment, and spending policies and two assumptions regarding real 
interest rates. 
  In scenario 1, current policies continue; the debt dynamics are clearly 
“unsustainable”: even under optimistic interest rate expectations, debt exceeds 
                                                  
2 Tracking public works budgets in Japan is tricky because so much of the spending is outside the 
regular budget of the central government. Thus, looking just at the "general expenditures" data 
there actually were declines each year from fiscal 1994 to 1999. 250% of GDP by 2015. (I define “unsustainable” as meaning that the debt-GDP ratio 
goes  to  infinity.)  Scenario  2,  like  Scenario  1,  assumes  government  spending  and  public 
investment policies remain unchanged, but also assumes the government sufficiently 
raises taxes so that the debt-to-GDP ratio stabilizes and eventually declines.  
Stabilization with 3% interest rates comes around 2015-25, at 140%-150%, and with 
6% interest is in the 2010s at just over 200%  
  As described later, the government is undertaking fiscal reform, and is 
planning deep cuts in spending and public investment.  Scenario 3 assumes the reforms 
are carried out. This leads to dramatically improved debt dynamics. Still, the 
debt-to-GDP  ratio  continues  to  grow,  albeit  significantly  more  slowly  than  in  Scenario 
1,  as  taxes  are  not  sufficient  to  cover  the  government’s  total  expenditures 
(including the interest payments on the outstanding debt). Note that at 6% interest 
the debt ratio increases steadily but at 3% it is fairly stable during 2005-35. This 
is because at 6% interest, debt grows much faster than GDP. 
  At 3% interest rates, spending cuts (Scenario 3) produces lower ratios than 
increased taxes (Scenario 2) but, at 6% rates, by 2030 the ratio in Scenario 3 is 
higher. The remainder of this section more fully explains the scenarios. 
 
2.1  Assumptions 
Because unfunded future social security liabilities are already accounted for in the 
scenarios, the net figure of 45% is taken as the initial ratio of debt-to-GDP. 
  The dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio are highly sensitive to assumptions 
regarding the real interest rate and the real GDP growth rate.  Other things being 
equal, the higher the real interest rate, the higher the ratio; and, the higher the 
real GDP growth rate, the lower the ratio. 
  Consistent with most forecasters’ projections of real GDP growth for the 
next  20  years  of  between  1%  and  1.5%  annually  (Japan  Center  of  Economic  Research  2001), 
the analysis here assume an average of 1.2% annually between 2000 and 2040. 
  There are two real interest rate assumptions.  The first is 3% because, since 
the early 1980s, Japanese real interest rates have averaged about 3% and that rate 
is used in other studies to project the path of future Japanese government deficits 
(IMF 2000, Jinno and Kaneko 2000). However, in the future, the Japanese government 
may no longer be able to borrow at such a low rate, and may have to borrow at higher 
international real rates. Thus, the second assumption is 6%, which reflects the 
average real cost of borrowing in international financial markets in the 1990s. Note 
that since 2000, the nominal interest rate on five- to six- year maturity Japanese 
Government Bonds (JGBs) has been close to 4%.  Because inflation rates are essentially zero, the real rate on Japanese government borrowing is now close to 4%.   
 
2.2  The Scenarios 
Scenario 1, the baseline, is that future government policies essentially remain 
unchanged. With regards to tax and public investment policies, the assumption is that 
the government keeps the tax-to-GDP and public investment-to-GDP ratios at current 
(average, 1996-99) levels. With regards to government spending policies, projections 
are more complicated, as population aging affects future government social security 
and health care expenditures. It is assumed that the government keeps age-specific 
expenditure patterns for social security, health care, and education constant at 
current (average 1996-99) real levels.  That is, if the average 67-year old receives 
190,000 yen in government health care in 2000, the average 67-year old in 2035 will 
receive  the  same  inflation-adjusted  amount.    In  addition,  it  is  assumed  that 
eligibility for social security remains 60, and for old age health care benefits, 
remains 70. Other government spending, mainly defense, policing, and administration, 
are assumed to always equal the average 1996-99 ratio to GDP of 5.6%.
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  Under these spending assumptions, Table 4 shows the projections of total 
government spending in 1995 yen and as a share of projected GDP. The shift in the 
age distribution towards the elderly significantly raises government spending. In 
particular,  in  2035  the  population  over  65  increases  significantly,  leading  to  a  spike 
in social security and health care spending. These spending projections (after 
rounding) are used directly in Scenarios 1 and 2. 
  In Scenario 3, in 2015 the age of eligibility for social security is raised 
to 65, and for old-age health care benefits, to 75. Other spending is reduced by 10% 
in  2005.  These  changes  in  social  security  and  in  old-age  health  care  correspond  roughly 
to what are actually included in the fiscal reform agendas. Public investment is cut 
especially sharply - to 3% of GDP by 2005 - the level prevailing in the United States 
(Muhleisen, 2000).   
 
 
3  The True Size of Government Liabilities 
 
                                                  
3 For social security, I divided average social security expenditures in 1996-99 by the population 
over age 60.  For health care, I allocate average health care spending in 1996-99 to different ages, 
using the age-specific expenditure patterns reported by in Ishi (2000). For education, I divide 
average education spending in 1996-99 by the population aged 5-20. Because of unfunded liabilities, the government’s true net obligations today may 
be substantially higher than the reported 45% of GDP. In addition to unfunded social 
security obligations, there are three main sources of unfunded liabilities. These 
are potential losses on government assets, explicit government guarantees of private 
sector lending, and implicitly guaranteed private sector loans. 
  Potential losses on government assets are significant.  A portion of the 
government’s assets represent soft loans that may not be repaid.  Many large public 
or joint public-private infrastructure projects financed from Fiscal Investment and 
Loan Program (FILP) loans generate less revenue than budgeted, which may imply 
significant contingent liabilities of the government.  Doi and Hoshi (this volume) 
show that many public corporations and local governments carrying out infrastructure 
projects are essentially insolvent.  They estimate the amount of potential government 
bailout of the FILP and the local governments as over 15% of 2000 GDP.  
  The second source of unfunded liabilities are explicit government guarantees 
of private sector lending.  Explicit guarantees are extended by the FILP and other 
government entities to encourage lending by private financial institutions. Examples 
are guarantees of bank deposits by the Deposit Insurance Corporation and of lending 
by  credit  cooperatives  to  small-  and  medium-  enterprises.  Although  these  do  not  entail 
fresh government lending, should the guaranteed loans not be repaid, the government 
must  cover  them  from  its  budget.    The  total  amount  of  outstanding 
government-guaranteed bonds and loans amounted to about 10% of GDP in 2000. Although 
historically only about 1% of such loans are never repaid, the percentage could soar 
if the Japanese economy worsens (Bayoumi 1998). 
  In  addition  to  explicit  government  guarantees,  there  are  implicitly 
guaranteed private sector loans. Historically, the Japanese government has shown a 
willingness to make good the irrecoverable loans of private financial institutions. 
In  2000  public  funds  spent  recapitalizing  the  banking  system  and  included  in 
government spending totaled about 8 yen trillion (2% of GDP).  This willingness 
represents implicit guarantees, and these guarantees are (unfunded) contingent 
liabilities  of  the  government.  Despite  the  large  amount  of  public  funds  already  spent, 
Fukao (this volume) argues that the Japanese government may have to expend additional 
funds to recapitalize the private banking system within the next two or three years.  
In that case, the cost to taxpayers would be equal to the estimated losses on problem 
loans minus the loan loss reserves of the banking sector.  Fukao calculates that this 
cost to taxpayers would be about 2% of GDP (7.6 trillion yen at March 2001). 
 
 4  Fiscal Reform Measures 
 
To restrain future increases in the government’s debt and in other liabilities, the 
government proposed several fiscal reform measures in the 1990s.  However, most of 
the measures were postponed or abandoned as the government sought to stimulate demand 
in light of the very weak domestic economy.  The 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Law, 
with its goal of eliminating fiscal deficits by 2003, is the most significant measure. 
  The main instruments in the 1997 law were cuts in government consumption and 
investment, rather than tax increases.  Public investment spending was to be cut by 
7% in 1998, with zero nominal growth until 2001; and energy, education, and overseas 
development assistance were to be cut by 10% in 1998, with annual reductions until 
2001 (Ishi 2000, p  149).   However,  with  the severe recession of  1997,  fiscal 
consolidation was put on hold, and a wide range of pump-priming measures were 
introduced.  In particular, rather than declining, public investment for 1998 was 
increased by over 10%. 
  Areas where the 1997 law had an effect were health care and social security.  
In 1997 the contribution rate and co-payments by patients for government health 
insurance schemes were increased sharply (Ishi 2000). In particular, patients aged 
70 and above are required to pay a fixed proportion (10%) of their medical costs. 
The government also capped prescription drug prices, which are very high in Japan. 
  In 2000, a social security reform bill based on the 1997 law passed the Diet.  
The bill contains provisions to cut lifetime benefits by about 20%.  Specifically, 
benefits for new retirees will be cut by 5%; the age of eligibility will, from 2013, 
be raised gradually from 60 to 65; and benefits will be subject to an earnings test.  
Analysts have estimated that these reforms will reduce government unfunded social 
security liabilities from the current 60% of GDP to 30% of GDP (IMF 2000). 
  The  government  is  planning  to  implement  further  cuts  once  the  economy  recovers 
fully.  A political commitment has been made to cap government deficit bond issues 
at 30 trillion yen (6%) of GDP in 2002.  Although “deficit” bonds reflect only a 
portion of total government borrowing, this ceiling should help lower future fiscal 
deficits. 
  As stipulated in the 1997 law, public investment is due for further cuts. 
Criticism has been directed at the economic value of public works projects, as well 
as contracting procedures.  To address the efficiency issues, new cost-benefit 
guidelines for reviewing projects were announced.  Contracting procedures also have 
been reformed.  Public works projects in fiscal 2002 (ends March 2003) were scheduled 
to be cut by 10%, although it unclear if the cuts will materialize.  The government intends to change the form of public works from traditional construction projects 
to  broader  social  infrastructure  investment.  This  includes  environment  and 
energy-related projects, telecommunications networks, scientific research, nursing 
homes, and the like. 
  With regards to health care, contribution rates and co-payments, especially 
by the elderly, are to increase further.  The stated goal is to restrict the growth 
of medical costs of the elderly to no more than the rate of inflation. In this regard, 
the Diet has just passed a law to increase the health care co-payment ratio from 20 
percent to 30 percent. The age of eligibility for elderly medical care eventually 
will also be raised from 70 to 75.  Further cuts are also planned in social security.  
There are even suggestions that average benefits be reduced by another 40% to avoid 
large increases in future contribution rates (Sakurai 1998). 
 
 
5  Interaction with Private Behavior 
 
The calculations of Japanese government debt reported in Table 3 implicitly assume 
that private behavior is unaffected by government fiscal policies.  However, in 
reality, fiscal policies clearly influence private behavior, and changes in private 
behavior  may,  in  turn,  affect  the  dynamics  of  government  debt.    For  example,  government 
taxation can alter the path of household saving and corporate investment which, in 
turn, can change tax collections. To better project the dynamics of government debt 
under an aging population, the interplay between fiscal policy and household and 
corporate behavior should be accounted for. To this end, I have constructed a 
simulation model. 
 
5.1  A Simulation Model 
In Dekle (2002) I projected the path of the government budget, together with the path 
of private saving and investment in Japan, using a formal dynamic economic growth 
model. Admittedly, the assumptions underlying the model's projections are somewhat 
special, but they are plausible and provide a fairly rigorous basis for analyzing 
policy implications. 
  Specifically,  I  closely  followed  Cutler,  Poterba,  Sheiner,  and  Summers  (1990) 
in  examining  the  impact  of  changing  demographics  on  government  debt,  private 
investment, and saving.  I simulated the growth model using the future path of 
demographics, summarized by the support ratio, which is the ratio of the labor force 
to the total population. The support ratio is projected to fall by 20% in the next 50 years.
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  In the model, firms maximize profits using labor, private capital, and public 
capital as inputs to produce output (GDP).  Firms are blessed with technical progress 
that raises the efficiency of labor by 1.2% a year.  Private capital can be loaned 
or borrowed at a constant international rental (real interest) rate of 6%. 
  I show that if the support ratio is constant, output per capita grows at 1.2% 
per year.  A declining support ratio, however, implies output per capita growth of 
less than 1.2%, as there are fewer workers to support the population. 
  Households are assumed to maximize not only their own welfare, but also the 
welfare of their children. Preferences are such that households desire to keep 
consumption per capita growing at a constant rate (“consumption smoothing”).  The 
model shows that by borrowing from international capital markets, households can 
indefinitely maintain growth in consumption per capita of 1.2%.  Thus, although 
consumption per capita grows at 1.2%, output per capita grows at less than 1.2% when 
the support ratio is declining.  Thus, a declining support ratio raises the ratio 
of consumption to output, and lowers the private saving rate. 
  In the model, the government performs three actions, always taking into 
account the effect of these actions on private behavior.  First, it supplies “goods 
and services” to households in the form of social security benefits, health care, 
and other  services.  Government expenditures of this form are assumed to be determined 
by the age structure of the population, and the time path of these expenditures is 
taken as given (from Table 4). 
  Second,  the government carries out public  investment to  supply  public  capital 
to  firms.    The  government  is  assumed  to  choose  the  time  path  of  public  capital  optimally, 
taking into account the offsetting effects of this public capital on GDP growth and 
on the public debt burden. 
  Third, the government levies a tax on households to pay for its spending and 
public investment, and this tax imposes efficiency losses on households. Given these 
efficiency losses, the model shows that the government will choose to levy a tax that 
is not fluctuating and is growing at the same 1.2% annual rate as consumption (“tax 
                                                  

















99 , where Ni  is the number of people of age i. 
Dekle (2002) can be downloaded from my web site: 
[www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/economics/Pages/faculty/fac_pages/web_dekle.htm]. smoothing”).  For the government to remain solvent, the present value of these taxes 
must be at least as large as the current stock of public debt plus the present value 
of all future government spending and public investment. That is, if government tax 
revenues are insufficient to cover government spending today, then tax revenues must 
exceed government spending in the future. 
 
 
6  Projections of Government Debt 
 
The path of government debt and of private saving and investment from 2000 to 2040 
are presented in Table 5, using the results of the model. Under tax smoothing, taxes 
per capita increase at a constant rate, while output per capita grows at a slower 
rate; thus, the tax-to-GDP ratio rises over time.  However, the actual tax rate in 
the starting year (2000), 28% of GDP, is lower than the 33% necessitated by tax 
smoothing and the requirement that the government be solvent.  To satisfy the 
government’s solvency constraint, taxes per capita are allowed to increase more 
rapidly between 2000 and 2015, and then increases in taxes per capita are smoothed 
from 2015 onward. By 2040, tax rates need to increase to almost 50% of GDP for the 
government to recoup its current outstanding debt, projected future spending (from 
Table 4), and projected future public investment (Table 5). 
  Government saving rates rise from about 1% to 2% of GDP in 2000 to about 10% 
in 2020 owing to the increased tax receipts.  Government saving rates decline somewhat 
in 2035 because of increases in social security and health care spending caused by 
the spike in the over-65 population in 2035. Because of falling public investment 
and high government saving, the fiscal surplus (government saving minus public 
investment) turns positive after 2020, and rises thereafter.  Thus, the decline in 
the government net debt-to-GDP ratio is fairly rapid between 2020 and 2040. 
  Private  saving  rates  are  projected  to  fall  a  few  percentage  points  until  2010, 
and then fall rapidly from 2010 to 2040.  This pattern is a result of declines in 
the support ratio and increases in tax rates, which reduces disposable income. 
Although consumption per capita grows at a constant 1.2%, output per capita grows 
at a slower rate (as the support ratio declines), thus lowering saving rates.  In 
effect, consumers are seeking to smooth their consumption when income is growing very 
slowly by lowering their saving rates. 
  As the labor force shrinks, the need to equip workers with capital equipment 
decreases,  and  both  private  and  public  investment  rates  decline.  The  private 
investment rate declines from 20% today to about 16% in 2040; the public investment rate declines from 8% today to about 6% in 2040. 
 
6.1  Comparison with Earlier Projections 
Only  a  few  studies  have  examined  the  interplay  between  fiscal  policy  and  private  saving 
and investment in Japan. As in my model, these earlier studies generally predict 
worsening government budget deficits unless there is significant fiscal reform, and 
declining saving and investment rates as the Japanese population ages. These studies 
start  from  the  premise  that  the  future  path  of  Japanese  government  debt  is 
unsustainable unless there is significant fiscal reform. Their reform scenarios are 
shown in Table 6. 
  The Economic Planning Agency (1998) study envisages significant cuts in 
future social  security benefits  and moderate increases in  payroll  taxes.  Consequently, 
government saving rises, while private saving falls sharply, as a result of the 
population aging. The International Monetary Fund (2000) study envisages reductions 
in  social  security  benefits,  sharp  cuts  in  public  investment,  and  increases  in  payroll 
and consumption taxes. Consequently, fiscal balances improve dramatically and the 
debt-to-GDP ratio first stabilizes then plummets. A special feature of the IMF model 
is that even when income declines, households do not decumulate their assets; thus, 
the fall in private saving is moderated.  Finally, the Japan Center for Economic 
Research (2001) envisages sharp increases in taxes and cuts in public investment. 
Consequently, fiscal balance improves, although debt-to-GDP continues to increase 
slightly owing to sluggish GDP growth. 
 
 
7  Conclusion 
 
The prospects for improvements in the Japanese fiscal situation are grim unless the 
government carries out significant fiscal reform. For example, under unchanged 
spending policies taxes would need to increase from the current 28% of GDP to over 
40%  by  2020  for  the  government  to  be  solvent.  Japanese  citizens  should  brace  themselves 
for painful adjustments in the near future, in the form of lower public services and 
higher taxes. 
  A resumption of strong growth in real GDP would reduce the need for spending 
and tax adjustments. For example, if real interest rates are 3%, a real GDP growth 
rate of slightly in excess of 3% can imply falling debt-to-GDP ratios. The analysis 
here has assumed that real growth averages just 1.2% per year from 2000 to 2040. This 
assumes labor-augmenting technical progress of about 1.2% per year, or total factor productivity growth (TFP) growth of 2.0% per year. TFP growth of 2.0% is actually 
an assumption on the high side, as it is about equal to Japan’s average TFP growth 
between 1970 and 1990, and Japan has not been as innovative it was then (Branstetter 
and Nakamura, this volume).  What lowers GDP growth from 2.0% to 1.2% is the dramatic 
0.8% annual decline in the labor force caused by the aging of the population. 
  Thus, one way to increase GDP growth is to raise the labor supply. Ono and 
Rebick (this volume) argue for removals of structural impediments that restrict the 
movement of labor between firms and discourage women from participating to a greater 
extent.  Another possibility that has received scant attention until now is to promote 
immigration into Japan.  Of high priority are further studies on the impact of 
increased foreign immigration on Japanese growth, saving, and the government debt. 
  An aging population does not necessarily mean that Japan will sink into 
international oblivion.  Certainly, Japanese policymakers are aware, not only of the 
problems associated with aging, but of a slew of proposals to address the problems, 
both directly, and indirectly, through removing the other impediments to growth 
discussed in this volume and elsewhere. References 
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Japanese Private and Government Saving, Investment, and Net Exports 
 
(in percent of GDP) 
 












1955-73  13.5  9.5  17.3  7.3  -1.5 
1974-79  26.3  3.1  20.7  9.2  -0.6 
1980-90  26.0  4.5  20.7  7.4  2.4 
1991-95  26.0  5.2  21.5  7.7  1.9 
1996-99  28.4  1.6  20.3  8.0  1.8 
 
1  Includes net social security surplus. 
2  Includes plant and equipment, housing, and inventory investment. 
 
Source:  Economic and Social Research Institute, Annual Report on the National 






Overview of Government Finances (All Figures are in Percent of GDP) 
 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 1999  
1.9  1.8  0.8  -2.4  -2.8  -4.1 -4.9 -3.7 -10.7 -7.0 Fiscal balance
1 
7.2  7.2  6.7  4.7  4.2  2.9 2.6 2.6 1.2 0.0 Government Saving 
      Of which: 
1.3  1.7  1.6  1.4  1.2  1.2 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.4 Social Security Surplus
-3.6  -3.5  -3.7  -3.8  -3.9  -4.1 -4.2 – 4.
1
-4.2 -4.3 Healthcare 
9.5  9.0  8.8  7.1  7.0  5.9 5.6 5.5 4.6 3.9 Other Surplus 
       
65.1  64.7  67.6  72.7  78.4  85.4 91.8 97.5 108.5 120.5 Gross Debt 
7.3  6.4  12.3  10.1  12.1  16.9 21.6 27.9 38.0 44.4 Net Debt A
2 
35.4  35.5  42.9  42.8  46.6  52.5 57.7 64.6 75.9 84.9 Net Debt B
3 
 
1  Government Saving plus Net Land Purchases and Net Gift and Inheritance Taxes minus 
Public Investment  
2  Including social security system assets. 
3  Excluding social security system assets. 
 
Source:  Economic and Social Research Institute, Annual Report on the National 





Debt-to-GDP Ratio Dynamics 
(in percent of GDP) 
 
Scenario 1:  Unchanged Government Policies 




spending  Debt if 3%
1  Debt if 6%
2 
2000  28  8  25  45  45 
2005  28  8  26  80  91 
2010  28  8  28  127  157 
2015  28  8  28  191  257 
2020  28  8  26  262  381 
2025  28  8  27  337  508 
2030  28  8  27  428  715 
2035  28  8  33  540  949 
2040  28  8  30  690  1263 
 


















2000  8  25  28  45  28  45 
2005  8  26  31  81  31  91 
2010  8  28  34  111  34  140 
2015  8  28  39  141  47  200 
2020  8  26  40  149  49  202 
2025  8  27  41  141  50  186 
2030  8  27  41  134  50  166 
2035  8  33  44  130  51  143 
2040  8  30  44  129  53  129 
 
Scenario 3:  Cuts in Spending and Investment 










2000  28  8  25  45  45 
2005  28  3  22  71  81 
2010  28  3  24  67  92 
2015  28  3  24  72  116 
2020  28  3  22  74  145 
2025  28  3  23  70  175 
2030  28  3  23  69  213 
2035  28  3  27  72  264 
2040  28  3  25  93  346 
 
1  Assuming a 3% real interest rate on government debt. 
























2000  57,667  27,271  16,327  10.7  5.3  3.2  24.8 
2005  65,265  28,471  15,634  11.9  5.4  2.9  25.8 
2010  74,032  29,462  15,445  13.9  5.7  3.1  28.2 
2015  78,318  30,550  15,067  14.1  5.7  2.8  28.2 
2020  78,903  30,659  14,689  13.2  5.1  2.4  26.3 
2025  79,098  30,089  13,680  14.2  5.2  2.3  27.3 
2030  79,683  29,392  12,923  14.2  5.2  2.3  27.3 
2035  81,630  28,764  12,167  18.3  6.3  2.7  32.9 
2040  81,046  28,407  11,915  16.1  5.7  2.4  29.8 
 
1  GDP projections are from the simulation model in Dekle (2002). 






Projections of Government Debt, and Private Saving and Investment Rates  




















2000  0.63  45  28  1  28  20  8 
2005  0.61  88  31  0  28  20  8 
2010  0.59  128  38  2  26  19  7 
2015  0.57  153  43  6  18  18  7 
2020  0.56  155  45  10  15  18  7 
2025  0.55  140  45  9  13  17  6 
2030  0.54  122  46  10  11  17  6 
2035  0.54  102  47  7  12  16  6 
2040  0.52  89  49  13  6  16  6 
 
1  Ratio of labor force to total population. Japanese government estimates. 
 




Earlier Projections of 
Japanese Government Debt and Saving and Investment Fiscal Reform Scenarios 
 
(in percent of GDP) 
 
2005  2010  2025  2050   
 
Economic Planning Agency (1998) 
 
-1.1  -  -0.5  0.3  Government Saving 
32.6  -  34.5  35.4  Tax Rate 
31.5  -  22.6  15.2  Private Saving 
32.8  -  25.0  20.2  Total Investment 
 
International Monetary Fund (2000) 
 
62.0  62.0  50.0  30.0  Net Government Debt1 
-6.0  2.0  3.0  0.0  Fiscal Balance2 
22.0  23.0  22.0  22.0  Private Saving 
 
Japan Center for Economic Research (2001) 
 
149  163  187  -  Gross Debt  
-6.0  -5.0  -2.1  -  Fiscal Balance 
46.0  47.3  49.9  -  Tax Rate 
 
 
1  Government Gross Debt minus Gross Assets. 
2  Government Saving minus Public Investment.  
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